Message 1:
Hope all is well. I just saw this Israel thing--nuts. I just wanted to ask you, as someone who follows this situation far more closely than I do, what Israel's goal is (really, what is their strategic calculus)? Do they just think that there is no reason to negotiate with the Palestinians? Do they really think there is no hope for peace? What do the Palestinians want as part of a two-state solution? Basically, what is your take on the situation (and I'll probably have more questions, if you are willing to answer them)?
Message 1 response:
In terms of the broader questions, I think it's probably a mistake to look at this at the level of the nation-state. I mean, one could identify a vague logic behind the Israel's actions: namely, that they think that they can drive apart the west bank and gaza, and force the fatah leadership in the west bank to accept terms very favorable to Israel. But, while true in broad strokes, that really doesn't get at the complications. It's probably best to see any policies emerging as being the result of a whole host of incommensurate logics (and very often illogics) that emerge in weird interactions between the various parties, international communities, army elites, an increasingly rightists Jewish citizenry, etc, and result in seemingly non-sensical policies, such as the so-called settlement freeze or the blockade of gaza.
And I'd say pretty much the same thing with the Palestinians. Unfortunately, the attempt to drive the West Bank and Gaza apart seems to be working. Both Fatah and Hamas have declared they want about the same thing: sovereignty over the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem (with some amount of land swap between the major settlement blocs and the Galilee region), a safe-passage between them, and some symbolic action on the right of return. (Of course, Israel refuses to grant true sovereignty of any kind, and certainly not over East Jerusalem, though again the specific actions -- like the lack of a settlement freeze -- I think shouldn't be analyzed at the level of the nation-state). So basically the big issue on the Palestinian's side is that no one can get Hamas and Fatah to the table for unity talks, and the second they do, Israel refuses to negotiate with "the terrorists."
Message 2:
Thanks for your response. What you said is pretty much what I'd assume. Basically, it seems that both sides think that stalling will give them the most advantageous position in the long run? Do you basically think it is hopeless, with the Palestinian people having little hope for the siege to be lifted, etc.? I think Mbeki had an interesting point when he said on al-Jazeera that for real peace to occur, the Palestinians need to unite and give up some major points (I would assume any claim to East Jerusalem, a revision of the Fatah and Hamas charters, etc., although I can't imagine how they could possibly give up a land swap or a symbolic right of return), but my question to you (out of my ignorance) is why the Palestinian "man/woman on the street," who seems to suffer FAR more than the average Israeli or Palestinian leader, doesn't demand that his or her leaders do something to make his or her life better? Do they just think that the only way to any real solution is to stall until their oppression becomes so brutal that the int'l community forces something? Leaving aside the moral questions, of which there are obviously many (and which almost all come out badly for Israel), why doesn't realist logic win out here (for the Palestinians)? (Also, I ultimately think that the moral condemnations coming from academia, again justified, really do so little to help the people suffering that I can't see their purpose, although I'd like to hear your opinion).
Message 2 Response:
First off, I don't think that Fatah is stalling: it seems Abbas is, bizarrely, trying to move forwards as fast as possible without Hamas. And I'm not entirely sure what they could do differently at the moment to speed things up.
Second, East Jerusalem is a non-starter. There is no questions that for any deal to be successful, Palestine's capital will have to be East Jerusalem. Nor is there any particular reason for Israel to hold onto it. Barring the strategy of the past two years or so, mostly emerging from the Jerusalem mayor's office, of circling Jerusalem with new, Jewish-only colonies, there is no particular reason for Israel to hold onto those territories, which are almost entirely inhabited by Palestinians. As for the charters, I think that there is probably too much emphasis placed on them: after all, several Israeli political parties still call for biblical Israel - but nobody cares because the state's laws and political realities make that, more or less, impossible.
Third, it is a mistake to think that it is the issue of Israel that is keeping Fatah and Hamas apart. Internationals often forget that there are a whole host of other issues within Palestinian politics, and it is probably those more than anything else that is keeping the two sides apart.
But onto the meat of the issue: I'm not entirely sure what it would mean for Palestinians to "demand that his or her leaders do something." What form would this demand take? What actions would Palestinians take? And why is there the assumption that the patron-client networks are not (economically, at least) responsive to those in them, and possibly even more so than alternatives? To be sure, there is widespread frustration with the Palestinian leadership. But the nature of that frustration is a bit more complex than the alternatives you phrase, I think.
And yeah, academic boycotts hardly ever work out. There are a few that are very well designed and have narrow goals (mostly surrounding education issues), but for the most part they are only symbolic actions.
Message 3:
Thanks again for taking the time to respond. You clearly know far more about internal Palestinian politics than I do; I rarely check al-Jazeera, and my Arabic is nowhere near good enough to really get into the heat of what someone is saying.
I agree with your take on East Jerusalem, but it seemed to me that for whatever reason Israelis will not give it up, and that, because of this unfortunate fact, it would behoove the Palestinian leadership to make some sort of deal and then try to work, perhaps slowly, on making East Jerusalem the capital. It seems like if the cost of getting an actual state is reneging a claim to East Jerusalem, at least for now, that would make sense.
Also, I have no doubt that the nature of Palestinian frustration with their leadership is far more complex than I made it out to be. But on some other level, I think it also probably isn't. I would think that the main issue for the vast majority of Palestinians, living under blockade and siege for decades, would be to get their own state already. This is the point Mbeki made in his speech--the South African movement was successful because it had one broad goal (a nonracial South Africa) and a united government.
I also agree that in realist power political perspectives it doesn't matter what the charters say. But I also believe that most people in any population, even the Jews, aren't that smart and it is therefore a useful propaganda tool for the Avigdor Lieberman and Shas' of the world (not to mention AIPAC, et al) to point to these phrases as an effective emotional tool to denigrate Palestinian statehood. It seems it would be a public relations coup for Hamas and Fatah to remove that inflammatory language from their charter. Being the weaker party, it is incumbent upon them to do so (this again leaves aside the moral question.)
I think that the actions the Palestinian people should take with respect to their leaders and the entire drive to statehood depends on the history. It appears that, unlike in other situations, the suicide bomb strategy failed (this is actually very interesting, because as Robert Pape pointed out in "Dying to Win," which examines the "strategic logic" of suicide terrorism, it usually does work), as did the Intifada movement, as did the rocket attacks, as did rejecting the 2000 accords in the hopes of getting a better deal. The Israeli response--again, a unique response given similar historical situations--has only been to draw a harder line in the sand (with regards this last point, I think it certainly has to do with historical memory and particularly the memory of the Holocaust. Again, I am leaving aside the moral issue.) This is demonstrated both with the Jewish encirclement plan in Jerusalem that you mentioned, the increase in settlements, the election of Bibi, Lieberman's appointment, etc. The Israeli populace has taken a turn to the right, and the American government supports this (for a litany of reasons, but either way it will not condemn Israel.)
Let's assume that the ultimate goal of the Palestinian people is statehood. To me, this leads the Palestinian people (obviously not a homogenous group) with several different strategic choices. I think the leadership needs to recognize that in this particular historical situation, violence will only be met with (disproportionate) violence; every time Israel is attacked, the Israeli government has made it a point to disproportionately react. Given that the U.S. will continue to allow this for the foreseeable future, a violent strategy does not seem prudent. This leaves, then, the Gandhian/MLK strategy, which has proven historically effective (I really don't buy into the argument that the Black Panthers and Malcolm X strategy had any real effect on improving the situation of African Americans). My question to you, who knows far more about Palestinian internal politics than I, is how come this strategy hasn't been proposed or enacted? It seems to me the only real way to achieve the ultimate goal--statehood. Not only that, in America and Israel you constantly hear the refrain "where is the Arab left/Arab moderates"? A peaceful protest movement seems to be the last untried and hopefully effective way to achieve statehood. Events like the one that happened last night, to me, appear to do little but further entrench anti-Palestinian Israeli sentiment. The reality of the situation is that peace depends on Israel feeling safe, on its own terms. Leaving aside whether this is justified, this appears to me to be the reality (I assume, of course, that Israeli's are in the final analysis not inveterately racist. I really don't think they are, and instead believe they are making realist calculations based on the situation as they see it).
What do you think?
Message 3 response:
So you make a lot of really good points. Let me try to address them in broad strokes, and if I miss any of the specifics, do let me know. Also, could you send me the Mbeki speech you are referencing? I don't think I've seen it.
So I think that it is a mistake for people like me and you, who are not directly involved in living the conflict, to try to make specific policy solutions. In the past, when you asked me what I wanted to happen there, I somewhat jokingly quoted a guy I used to organize with in high school as saying that the ideal was a zero-state solution, but barring that a one-state solution would do. The absurdity was/is intentional: the point is that me and you have no way of rationally determining the importance of the E Jerusalem vs the establishment of a state in general, since these are not the type of claims that can be subjected to rational calculations. It will simply have to be worked out by the parties. In other words, I think it is important to condemn massacres and human rights violations (although with the caveat that this is a highly instrumentalizing, moralizing, and political claim that will certainly not do for academic analysis -- but that's why I don't work on Is/Pal). In the meantime, I think it's fine for us to talk about motivations of the various parties, to make predictions and analyses (such as mine that the exclusion of E Jerusalem will lead to the collapse of negotiations, or that the talk about the charters seems unproductive), and to call out horrible violations of basic dignity when we see them, but it is probably crossing the line to try to dictate a specific and detailed solution (like specific borders), as Bill Clinton discovered. Anyway, that is my politics, though again it is a poor basis for academic analysis, and ultimately boils down to an ethical claim on my part that you might not share.
I will point out, however, that there are a good number of non-violent movements in Palestine, but that they are being routinely ignored by the media. They are also completely ineffective by any measure. (Also, I'd contest that Gandhi was non-violent, but I think we've had that discussion before). Again, I'd say that political tactics are a product of the place and time and that me and you don't get to choose how people resist violent occupation. Rather than assume a scale of proper to improper forms of resistance (a calculus that always benefits the powerful), I think it's best to try to understand the internal logics of such movements. In other words, our current position affords us the opportunity to declare Gandhi and the ANC as heros now, but don't forget that at the time they were seen as terrorists by many, including the U.S. government. Maybe in 20 years, we'll be asking why the new terrorists aren't behaving like Fatah and Hamas, or maybe we won't. These (a)historical comparisons tend to flatten out the specific histories and sociologies of these various conflicts in ways that distort both contexts far more than they illuminate. That and the fact that non-violent movements have been and are being enacted to very little effect.
The only other point I'd make is that Israel is not going to feel safe no matter what happens. Any time anyone proposes actual sovereignty over any amount of the West Bank, the Israeli defense intelligentsia starts flipping out. Not sure why this is, but again I think asking what Palestine needs to do to make Israel feel safe is probably not a very productive starting point. To be perfectly honest, Israel has painted itself into quite the corner, a corner which seems more and more likely to make a 2 state solution impossible. I could be wrong and hopefully I'm being overly pessimistic, but (without going into too much detail) the combination of nearly unchecked settlement expansion, mass exodus of young, lefty Israelis, and an increasingly alienated and rapidly growing population of Palestinian citizens of Israel seems to indicate that the chances of a one state solution seem more and more likely. Of course, if I am right (and I hope I'm not) it will be at least another generation before any of this even starts to get done. Of course, this is only about the West Bank. Once you start talking about Gaza, you are in a whole other, and far more intractable, situation.
On a more academic level: It's been a while since I looked at Pape's argument, but I remember him flattening out the distinctions behind the logics of suicide attacks, which he separates out (for some reason) from terrorism in general. Although I believe he names Hamas as one successful instance of a suicide bombing strategy. If you are interested, I'd recommend Talal Asad's short book on suicide bombing: I don't agree with all of his claims - I'm going to be rereading it this summer, but I remember it being a bit too Kantian at times for my tastes - but it is gaining a lot of steam in the academy for being the first real attempt to figure out what it is about suicide bombing that the West finds so disturbing, and I remember it being a very good read. Plus it's short.
Message 4:
Thanks for your response. Here is the Mbeki speech (http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/05/26/lessons_of_the_south_africa_experience_thoughts_on_the_israel_palestinian_conflict).
I would generally agree with you regarding outsiders making specific policy decisions, but in this case I would say (and I'm quoting Mbeki), the fact that both the Israelis and Palestinians have made an external mediating force central to their negotiations make it imperative for citizens of that force to think about the solution to this problem in Palestinian's terms. That is to say, this is not only of interest to the US because it is of actual interest to us, but also because the parties themselves have made it our interests (under our influence of course).
I think we would likely ascribe to, quoting Weber, the "theoretical rationality" of the issue. That is, our ethics are probably almost exactly the same. However, where we differ is regarding the "practical rationality" of the issue. My previous responses to you were based in this practically rational realm, with the ultimate good being defined as sovereignty for Palestine. When I am making a theoretically rational argument, it would be very different from the one I made earlier. But this is why "Science as a Vocation" and "Politics as a Vocation" are both very different. I'm not saying ethics should not have a role in policymaking--it must, in fact--but that this role will necessarily be subsidiary, especially in a world of asymmetric information.
I've read Asad before, and liked him. But I think the reason Americans, and I would say most people--not just westerners--find suicide bombing repulsive is pretty simple: most people of any culture find dying for any cause not their own to be unexplainable. It is just a typical example of not respecting that other people may consider what they would die for as important as what you would die for. Americans die for their nation, as do Palestinians, but we don't see it as such (either way, I agree, a no state solution is best. But unfortunately we live in a practically rational world).
Would like to know what you think.
Message 4 response:
I think what you say is mostly correct. The only thing I would say is that while you may take Palestinian sovereignty as the ultimate good, this may not be what Fatah or Hamas takes as its ultimate good. Or even more likely, what you define as sovereignty may be different from what they define as sovereignty. Or to put this closer to the terms you have used, the dividing line between practical and theoretical rationality, or between ethics and politics may not be as clear cut as Weber would imply. More to the point, these divides may be an effect these basic questions of politics and foundation rather than their cause.
As for the Asad, I think it is precisely an attempt to explain why it is that people find it unexplainable and horrific.
Thanks for the Mbeki speech. I'll try to get to it soon.
Message 5:
I pretty much agree with what you said. As time moves on, peace just seems literally impossible; it almost makes me want to stop thinking about it at all.
